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Abstract
This paper explores the calibration of laboratory models in population genetics as an
experimental strategy for justifying experimental results and claims based upon them following
Franklin (1986, 1990) and Rudge (1996, 1998). The analysis provided undermines Coyne et al.’s
(1997) critique of Wade and Goodnight’s (1991) experimental study of Wright’s (1931, 1932)
Shifting Balance Theory. The essay concludes by further demonstrating how this analysis bears
on Diamond’s (1986) claims regarding the weakness of laboratory experiments as evidence, and
further how the calibration strategy fits within Lloyd’s (1987, 1998) account of the confirmation
of ecological and evolutionary models.
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1. Introduction
This paper explores calibration of laboratory models in population genetics as an experimental
strategy for justifying experimental results and claims based upon them. Calibration as such an
experimental strategy has been discussed by Franklin (1986, 1990, 1997) and Rudge (1996,
1998). In those works, the intuition is that scientists have greater reason to believe in the validity
of the results of an experimental apparatus when the apparatus can be shown to reproduce known
phenomena. This paper explicates a type of calibration that  neither Franklin nor Rudge consider
in any detail, but which fits within their frameworks. I argue that the apparatuses of laboratory
models in population genetics are calibrated to parameters describing natural populations in
order to provide scientists greater reason to believe that artificial selection experiments done in
the laboratory correspond to natural selection processes in natural populations. I further
demonstrate how my analysis of calibration bears on claims about the weakness of laboratory
experimental evidence made by Diamond (1986) and, further, how the calibration strategy fits
within Lloyd’s (1987, 1988) account of the confirmation of ecological and evolutionary models.
Ultimately, my view is that calibration of laboratory models is a key experimental strategy
(following Darden’s 1991 conception of a strategy) for justifying claims about the relationship
between laboratory experiments and natural processes.1
The paper is driven by a case study in contemporary population genetics, somewhat
familiar to philosophers of biology, i.e., Wade and Goodnight’s (1991) experimental study of
Wright’s (1931, 1932) Shifting Balance Theory. The calibration strategy under scrutiny in this
paper is manifest particularly in defending Wade and Goodnight’s (1991) results from recent
                                                      
1
 Darden (1991, p. 20) defines “strategy” as a hypothetical or advisory method, procedure, practice, or principle
(used in cycles of discovery, evaluation, and revision).
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criticism by Coyne, Barton, and Turelli (1997). So, the case study, in a narrow sense, is played
out as a defense I explore of Wade and Goodnight against Coyne, Barton, and Turelli’s criticism,
and in a broad sense played out as my articulation of a key epistemological feature of the
calibration of laboratory models in population genetics. I begin in section (2) with a brief review
of Franklin’s and Rudge’s explications of calibration. In section (3), I present in some detail
Wade and Goodnight’s experimental study of Wright’s Shifting Balance Theory. In section (4), I
present and respond to Coyne, Barton, and Turelli’s critique of Wade and Goodnight,
highlighting calibration as key to the response. In section (5), I discuss my analysis of calibration
in a more philosophical context. Section (6) is reserved for concluding remarks.
2. Franklin and Rudge on Calibration
Via historical case studies from high energy physics, Franklin (1986, 1990) introduced a set of
experimental strategies he packaged as an epistemology of experiment. Franklin’s broad aim was
to demonstrate that claims based on experimental results are warranted, pace the then key social
constructivists of science, such as Collins (1985). Franklin offered nine experimental strategies
in his earlier work, of which one was the strategy of experimental checks and calibration.2 To
demonstrate the reasonableness of the strategies, Franklin justifies each using the Bayesian
epistemology. Franklin (2002) has continued and expanded his work on epistemology of
experiment. Here, I constrain my discussion to calibration.
More important for my purposes is Rudge’s (1996, 1998) application of Franklin’s
epistemology of experiment into the domain of evolutionary biology. Only a small handful of
philosophers of biology have critically examined the nature and epistemology of experiment in
                                                      
2
 Franklin’s (1986, 1990) strategies include the following: experimental checks and calibration, reproducing artifacts
known to be present, intervention, independent confirmation using different experiments, elimination of error, using
the results to argue for their validity, using an independently well-corroborated theory of the phenomena to explain
the results, using an apparatus based on a well-corroborated theory, using statistical arguments.
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evolutionary biology. Notable work has been done by Brandon (1994), Diamond (1986),
Dietrich (1996), and Griesemer and Wade (1988). Rudge’s work is probably the most systematic,
because he aims to provide, as Franklin did for high energy physics, a description of the
character of experiment in evolutionary biology as well as its epistemology. Rudge (1996, 1998)
takes Franklin’s epistemology and critically examines it against a handful of detailed historical
case studies, most notably Kettlewell’s studies of industrial melanism in the peppered moth,
Biston betularia (Rudge 1998). Rudge found that Franklin’s experimental strategies were used in
the Kettlewell work and, further, that additional, Franklin-like strategies could be drawn from
that work.3 Further, like Franklin, Rudge “epistemologizes” his experimental strategies using the
Bayesian epistemology.
Recently, Rudge (2001) has compared his Bayesian analysis of the Kettlewell work with
an analysis of that work using Mayo’s (1996) error statistical epistemology of experiment. Rudge
now thinks that Mayo’s epistemology of experiment better captures the epistemology of the
Kettlewell experimental work. But the issue exercising Rudge here is one over the Bayesian and
error statistical approach to understanding the growth of knowledge, and not whether the
experimental strategies identified in Rudge (1996, 1998) apply. At any rate, I want to avoid the
debate over the relative merits of Bayesian and error statistical justifications of experimental
strategies, but nevertheless attach calibration as an experimental strategy to Lloyd’s (1987, 1988)
work on confirmation of ecological and evolutionary models.
According to Rudge (1998, pp. 346-347), the basic intuition behind assessing
experimental checks and calibration is that biologists have greater reason to believe in the
validity of the results of an experimental apparatus when the apparatus can be shown to
reproduce known phenomena. In ecological genetics, e.g., field studies (i.e., observational or
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 Rudge (1998, p. 352) mentions the use of controls as an additional strategy.
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experimental studies done in naturally occurring populations) often make use of certain kinds of
traps. The traps are used to capture specific organisms for marking, release, and recapture. The
data is used for such things as estimates of gene frequency fluctuation. Rudge says that assuring
the traps are in proper working order is part and parcel of experimental checks and calibration
(Rudge 1998, p. 348). Further checks and calibrations, related to the ecological genetics
example, might include a review of literature to determine whether a specific kind of trap is
appropriate for the kind of study one is doing (Rudge 1998, p. 348). Rudge is echoing Franklin:
If an apparatus reproduces known phenomena, then a scientist is justified in her belief that the
apparatus is reliable. And if the apparatus is reliable, then the results produced by it during an
experiment are warranted.
Rudge stretches Franklin’s conception of “apparatus” (following Kohler 1994) to make
his point, above. For Rudge, the apparatus includes microscopes, vials, dyes, nets, incubators,
and even organisms, and populations of organisms (cf. Griesemer and Wade 1988, p. 71). The
calibration of each of these parts of the apparatus are, as Rudge argues, important for assessing
whether the experimental apparatus is working properly. After all, in many experiments in
evolutionary biology, the evolutionary processes causing change in gene frequencies are under
scrutiny. And the apparatuses used in those studies include traps, cages, pipettes, vials,
incubators, and populations of organisms. But notice that Rudge’s point above is made by
emphasizing the specifically instrumental parts of the apparatus. He only briefly mentions
calibration of the actual populations of organisms that are part of the apparatus (Rudge 1996, p.
266, 2000).
Consider laboratory models, where a laboratory model is an implementation of the
materials, apparatus, and maintenance procedures for the apparatus structured by an
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experimental design (e.g., Griesemer and Wade 1988, Lloyd 1987, 1988). Calibration of the
relevant populations is important for assessing whether the experimental apparatus is working
properly as Rudge would argue. But, as Rudge does not argue, and which is equally if not more
important, calibration of the relevant populations is crucial to justifying claims based on
experimental results that the processes at work in laboratory populations could work in nature
(cf. Griesemer and Wade 1988, pp. 71, 81, 84). The idea is this: Claims based on artificial
selection experiments done in the laboratory can be justifiably extrapolated to claims about
natural selection operating in natural populations if the laboratory model, particularly features of
the apparatus as articulated here –the populations of organisms− are matched, or tuned, or
calibrated, to relevant features of natural populations. The next two sections articulate this point
by contextualizing it within a scientific case.
3. An Experimental Study of The Shifting Balance Theory
In 1991, Wade and Goodnight published, in Science, the results of what they took to be an
experimental (laboratory) test of Wright’s Shifting Balance Theory (SBT) (Wade and Goodnight
1991). At the time, and it seems to me even now, Wade and Goodnight’s study represents the
most important contemporary experimental study of the SBT in existence. Indeed, it is the only
contemporary comprehensive laboratory study of the SBT.
Wright developed his SBT in his classic (1931) and (1932) papers and it is fully
articulated in his four volume magnum opus, Evolution and the Genetics of Populations  (1968,
1969, 1977, 1978). What Wright was looking for in 1931 and 1932 were the ideal conditions for
evolution to occur given specific assumptions about the relationship between Mendelian heredity
and the adaptive value of gene complexes (Wright 1931, p. 158, 1932, p. 163). Wright in
particular emphasized what he thought of as the universality of gene interaction, or epistasis, and
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its role in the evolutionary process. The consequences of Wright’s emphasis on epistasis led him
to the view that the “adaptive landscape” of the possible field of gene combinations in a
population of organisms was “hilly” (Wright 1932). That is, for Wright, the evolutionary
consequences of epistasis meant that genes adaptive in one combination would be maladaptive in
another. As such, the surface of the adaptive landscape would be made up of adaptive “peaks”
and “valleys.” Wright’s problem, i.e., the problem of “peak shifts,” was to articulate the
evolutionary process by which a population could make its way to the highest adaptive peak in
the fastest time.
Wright argued that the ideal conditions to solve his problem meant that evolution
occurred in structured, smallish populations with specific mutation and migration rates. Wright’s
SBT captures these ideal conditions in what he called the shifting balance process. A rough
summary of the SBT, sufficient for my purposes, goes as follows: Evolution proceeds via a
shifting balance process through three phases: Phase I – Random genetic drift causes
subpopulations  semi-isolated within the global population, i.e.,  demes, to lose fitness; Phase II
– Mass selection on complex genetic interaction systems raises the fitness of those
subpopulations; Phase III – Interdemic selection then raises the fitness of the large or global
population. 4
By 1991, biologists did not know whether the conditions of Wright’s phase III (in his
theoretical model) were met by populations in nature (Wade and Goodnight 1991, p. 1015).
Indeed, only mathematical investigations, and importantly that by Crow et al. (1990), had been
done. The key issue concerning phase III of the SBT is how population structured selection
raises the fitness of the global population. More specifically: Population structured selection is
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 For more detailed, historical presentations of the development of Wright’s SBT, see Gayon (1998), Hodge (1992),
Provine (1971, 1986), Skipper (2000, 2002).
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selection driven by migration. Members of local populations that are especially fit migrate to
another local population. There, they mate with members of the new-found local population. The
traits of the migrants are then spread through the new-found local population. This causes the
fitness of the global population to be raised via interdemic selection through differential
dispersion (Wade and Goodnight 1991, p. 1015).
Figure 1 below is Wade and Goodnight’s graphical depiction of their experimental design
for their experimental test, as they call it, of the third phase of Wright’s SBT. The idea behind
the experiment is as follows. Wade and Goodnight argue that if they can show that interdemic
fitness can increase in response to selection driven by differential dispersion of migrants, then
they have shown that the third phase of Wright’s SBT can occur. If features of the laboratory
models can further be calibrated so that there is some identifiable correspondence to natural
populations, then Wade and Goodnight believe that there is evidence that Wright’s third phase is
likely to occur in nature. Further, because the third phase of Wright’s SBT explicitly involves
features of Wright’s shifting balance process that are endemic to its other two phases (e.g.,
random genetic drift) and more generally its underlying assumption of the role of gene
interaction in evolution, then Wade and Goodnight believe that their experiment is a
comprehensive test of Wright’s SBT.
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Fig. 1: Reproduction of Wade and Goodnight’s figure depicting their experimental design (Wade
and Goodnight 1991, p. 1016). Figure 1A depicts the experimental lines in which selection is
imposed. Figure 1B depicts the control lines in which only migration, with no selection, occurs.
Note especially the computation of relative fitness of demes.
Wade and Goodnight’s experiment consisted of three experimental and three control
treatments using laboratory populations of the flour beetle, Tribolium castaneum. Each treatment
followed either an experimental array or a control array. Each array consisted of 50 demes of 20
breeding adults (N) each. The founders were selected at random from laboratory stock. Fitness of
the demes (demic fitness, W) was measured as the census number of the adult offspring produced
by the 20 breeding adults in a 60-day period (P, for productivity).
After 60 days, census data were used to assign relative interdemic fitnesses. Demes with
larger populations had higher relative fitness than demes with smaller ones. Based on the
measures, migrants in the experimental treatments would be dispersed to different demes (this
was the imposition of Wright’s third phase). In the control group, migration was random, but the
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number of total migrants (M) was determined by the number of migrants in the corresponding
experimental array. Phase III was imposed in the following way: In the experimental array (A),
migrants from demes that are high in productivity are placed in demes that are low in
productivity. So, there is (artificial) migration from demes of high fitness to demes of low fitness
(following Crow et al. 1990). In the control array (B), there is the same amount of migration, but
the dispersion is not from demes of high productivity to demes of low productivity. Rather, it is
non-patterned.
Figure 2 below illustrates one way of imposing population structured selection driven by
differential dispersion. In the experimental array (A), P1 has the highest relative fitness. So,
migrants are taken from it and put into the migrant pool M. P3 has a relative fitness of 1.00, so no
migrants are taken. Because the relative fitness of P2 is less than 1.00, P2 receives migrants from
the migrant pool M but contributes none. All demes now have 20 members. Notice that migrants
were taken from a deme of high fitness to a deme of low fitness. This is the essence of Wright’s
third phase. In the control array (B), the migration pattern from P1…Pn to the migrant pool M and
back into P1…Pn is random, but the same numbers migrate (which is a function of the
experimental array’s census).
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Fig. 2: Reproduction of an example of Wade and Goodnight’s (1991, p. 1017) imposition of
selection driven by differential dispersion. Fig. 2A is the experimental array; Fig. 2B is the
control array.
The experimental (E) treatments were imposed three times and each had their own
control (C) treatments. The pairs of experimental (E) and control (C) treatments differed with
regard to the frequency with which artificial selection was imposed. In the first (E1-C1)
treatment, experimental and control protocols were imposed every generation. In the E2-C2 pair,
the protocols were imposed every two generations: In alternating, non-selection generations, 20
adults were selected at random from each deme in the experimental array (E2) of 50 demes and
each group of 20 was used to reestablish a deme; the same was done in the C2 control (there was
no migration of any kind in the odd E2-C2 generations). In the E3-C3 pair, the protocols were
imposed every third generation analogous to the E2-C2 treatment.
Wade and Goodnight varied the imposition of differential and random migration in the
three trials in order to investigate the interaction between random genetic drift and (directional)
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interdemic selection. Because Wade and Goodnight varied the treatments in the way that they
did, they were able to further investigate Wright’s shifting balance process as a whole rather than
simply the third phase. The results, summarized graphically, are reproduced in Figure 3 below.
The interdemic selection differential in the three experimental treatments is the difference
between the mean productivity of the selected parent demes (∑ 50/iii Pw ) and the mean
productivity of the unselected demes (P.), divided by the standard deviation of the unselected
array (see Figure 1B). The standardized response to interdemic selection is the difference
between the means of the experimental and control treatment pairs divided by the standard
deviation of the control. The regression of the standardized response on the cumulative selection
differential is the realized interdemic heritability.
An additive population genetics model was used to predict results. On the additive model,
the expected results are that the three treatments will show that the responses to selection, i.e.,
the differences in mean phenotype between the progeny generation and the previous generation,
are homogeneous (Wade and Goodnight 1991, p. 1017). That is, the slopes of the lines in the E1-
C1, E2-C2, E3-C3 ought to all be homogeneous. Such results are expected because on an
additive selection model, according to which random  genetic drift and directional selection
oppose each other, the response to interdemic selection should be proportional to the selection
differential, i.e., the difference in mean phenotype between the selected parents and the entire
parental population. After all, on the additive assumption random genetic drift acts to increase
genetic variation among demes whereas directional interdemic selection should, given the
assumption of additivity of genetic variance, act to decrease variation among demes.5
                                                      
5
 The assumption of additivity of genetic variance means effects of alleles on phenotypes are averaged  over the
variety of genetic combinations in which they occur; an allele is said to act additively if its effect is independent of
the other alleles with which it is combined. Notice that this assumption contrasts with Wright’s emphasis on the non-
additive component of genetic variance, i.e., the statistical effects of the interaction of an allele with the other alleles
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Indeed, using an additive model, the expected FST values (inbreeding coefficients
measuring population structure, or the among-deme genetic variation, see Wright 1951a, 1969)
can be computed (Wade and Goodnight 1991, p. 1017). Given a ratio of effective population size
(Ne) –the number of individuals in a theoretical ideal population having the same magnitude of
genetic drift as the actual population− to observed deme size (N) (where Ne < N) of 0.90, the
expected FST increases almost linearly by generation: 0.0278 after one generation, 0.0548 after
two generations, and 0.0811 after three generations (with no migration). If there are only additive
genetic effects on fitness (and if the environment is held constant), then the interdemic selection
differential is proportional to FST . This means that the interdemic selection differential in the E2
treatment should be twice that of the E1 treatment and the E3 treatment three times that of the E1
treatment. The frequency of selection in Wade and Goodnight’s experiments is the inverse of the
above. So, the smaller selection differential applied every generation in E1 should produce the
same response as the selection differential in E2, or three times that in E3.
During the experiment, Wade and Goodnight measured effective deme size and random
genetic drift using a single locus (Wade and Goodnight 1991, p. 1018). Observed FST  (in C2 at
generation 13) was 0.0288. In the next generation, the FST  was 0.0470. There appears to be an
almost linear increase in FST  (as the additive model predicted). Wade and Goodnight further
found that the ratio of effective population size to observed deme size was 0.90, agreeing with
their estimates from the additive model discussed above. In spite of the agreement between
expected and observed FST  and (Ne/N) ratio, Wade and Goodnight did not get the expected
results: As is manifest, the slopes of the lines in Figure 3 are heterogeneous, not homogeneous.
                                                                                                                                                                             
with which it is combined, such as epistasis and dominance. The role of the additive model in contrast to Wright’s
emphasis on non-additive genetic variance will become clearer as the discussion proceeds.
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Fig. 3: Reproduction of Wade and Goodnight’s (1991, p. 1017) table of experimental results. See
Wade and Goodnight’s caption in the figure.
In Figure  3, the regression of the responses to selection on the cumulative selection
differential for all treatments (E1-C1, E2-C2, E3-C3) are shown. This is the realized interdemic
heritability. All of the slopes are greater than zero indicating a statistically significant response to
the imposed interdemic selection in all treatments. The heterogeneity of the slopes are contrary
to the additive model’s prediction that because selection is standardized across the X-axis in all
treatments the responses should all be equal (Wade and Goodnight 1991, p. 1018): The realized
interdemic heritability was two times greater in the E2 (0.383) than in the E1 treatment (0.207)
(in spite of the reduced selection frequency). Additionally, the realized interdemic heritability in
E1 (0.207) was equivalent to that of E3 (0.205) (again in spite of the reduced frequency of
selection in the E3). Finally, even though E2 and E3 were nearly equal in total heritability (S)
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(2.826 vs. 2.565) and average population size given migration (Nm) (0.99 vs. 0.86) the response
to selection was two times larger in the E2.
According to Wade and Goodnight, if there are non-additive gene effects on fitness of the
sort Wright emphasized, then random genetic drift can operate to more rapidly produce
significant heritable variation among demes in gene combinations. However, Wade and
Goodnight did not know the distribution of adaptive peaks owing to co-dependent gene
complexes. Moreover, Wade and Goodnight did not know the extent to which interdemic
selection by differential dispersion could export the gene combinations to other demes of lower
fitness. Wade and Goodnight do cite Crow et al. (1990), who suggest that the rate could be small.
Nevertheless, Wade and Goodnight conclude that their experimental design is a laboratory model
of Wright’s shifting balance process (based on the realized response to their imposition of third
phase selection).
Based on their experimental study, Wade and Goodnight (1991, p. 1018) conclude that
phase III of Wright’s shifting balance process can cause an evolutionary change in mean fitness
compared to control populations (non-shifting balance populations) with identical amounts of
island model migration. Wade and Goodnight further claim that because their statistical
measures of genetic differentiation among demes (i.e., population structure) in their observations
match, are tuned to, or are calibrated to a variety of natural populations of animals and plants
(e.g., Loveless and Hamrick’s 1984 review of population structure field data, Wright’s 1978
review of numerous field observations of population structure of various species), Wright’s SBT
is likely to be an important description of evolution in nature. Wade and Goodnight use the b
allele in the C2 treatment to measure among-deme genetic variation and found FST values
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between 0.03 and 0.05. Wright (1931, 1932, 1977, 1978) argued that the shifting balance process
described by the SBT should affect evolution with this degree of genetic subdivision.
Loveless and Hamrick (1984) and Wright (1978) contain comprehensive reviews of data
concerning population size and structure among plants and animals. Loveless and Hamrick pay
special attention to the ecological determinants of the genetic structure of populations of plants.
They review isozyme data from 163 studies representing 124 plant taxa to examine the
associations between ecological factors and the distribution of allozyme variation. Each taxon
was classified across 10 ecological traits, breeding system, floral morphology, mode of
reproduction, pollination mechanism, seed dispersal, phenology, life cycle, timing of
reproduction, successional stage and geographic range. Measures of the genetic structure of
demes were reported for 19 species of plants across 29 studies (Loveless and Hamrick 1984, pp.
86-89). Of the 19 species, 13 had GST  values (a generalized measure of FST) between 0.03 and
0.05, consonant with Wade and Goodnight’s laboratory model.
Wright (1978, especially chapters 2, 3, 6, 9) provides a comprehensive review of
population structure data from a staggering number of studies. Wright found FST values between
0.03 and 0.05 in various species of trees, perennials such as Phlox pilosa, the desert annual
Linanthus parryae, as well as varieties of Drosophila, the land snail Cepaea nemoralis, the rusty
lizard, Sceloporus olivaceus, the prairie mouse, Peromyscus polionotus, and human groups based
on blood group data. As in the Loveless and Hamrick (1984) review, Wright’s statistical analyses
cut across numerous ecological factors. The aim of Wright’s review, the last volume of his four
volume magnum opus, is a sweeping analysis of variability within and among natural
populations. The work is not without its critics (e.g., Coyne et al. 1997), and itself critically
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reanalyzes historical work Wright, with others (such as Dobzhansky), had done during the period
of the evolutionary synthesis (1930s-1950s).
Ultimately, because the population structure of the population in Wade and Goodnight’s
laboratory model is calibrated to population structure of a variety of natural populations, and that
population structure is ideal for Wright’s shifting balance processes to occur, there is reason to
think that the shifting balance process as observed in the laboratory corresponds to evolutionary
processes as they occur in nature (see also Crow 1991 for a similar, brief, interpretation of Wade
and Goodnight 1991). More abstractly, Wade and Goodnight think that because their laboratory
system is calibrated to natural systems, the claims made about the laboratory system can be
extrapolated to natural systems. In the next section of the paper, the calibration strategy is
applied in the context of a recent critique of Wade and Goodnight’s (1991) experimental study
by Coyne et al. (1997).
4. A Response to Coyne, Barton and Turelli’s Critique of Wade and Goodnight
In 1997, Coyne, Barton, and Turelli published what is now a well-known critique of Wright’s
SBT (Coyne et al. 1997). In that paper, Coyne et al. argue that Wright’s SBT describes a
relatively insignificant evolutionary process, opting for the mass selection alternative originally
described by R. A. Fisher (1930, 1958, 1999). Briefly, Fisher’s Large Population Size Theory
(LPST) embraces assumptions at odds with Wright’s SBT. In particular, Fisher emphasized that
the ultimate fate of a gene is determined by its average effect with respect to fitness, i.e., that
alleles act additively on phenotypes, within large, randomly mating or panmictic populations so
that co-dependent gene complexes arise as a by-product of the effects of selection acting on
single genes (Wade 1992, p. 38). During the period 1929-1962, Fisher and Wright engaged in
Calibration of Laboratory Models in Population Genetics
20
numerous and sometimes acrimonious debates over the evolutionary implications of the
differences between their theories (Provine 1986).
Reminiscent of the exchanges between Fisher and Wright, Coyne et al.’s (1997) paper
spurred an exchange with Wade and Goodnight over the relative significance of the SBT versus
the LPST (Wade and Goodnight 1998, Goodnight and Wade 2000, Coyne et al. 2000). In the
evolutionary biology community today, Fisher’s LPST probably has the most support, even if
Wright’s contributions to evolutionary biology are widely hailed. However, Skipper (2002)
analyzed the general logic of the exchange  between Coyne et al. and Wade and Goodnight and
argued in defense of Wade and Goodnight and, therefore, Wright. The critique of Wade and
Goodnight’s (1991) study raised here is but a highly focused portion of Coyne et al.’s (1997)
paper and is discussed here in more detail than in Skipper (2002).
Coyne et al. (1997, p. 663) have argued that Wade and Goodnight’s (1991) conclusion is
unwarranted because their results are ambiguous. That is, Coyne et al. claim that Wade and
Goodnight do not adequately impeach the alternative (Fisherian) hypothesis to Wright’s shifting
balance hypothesis that mass selection on additive genetic effects accounts for the experimental
results of the 1991 study.6 According to Coyne et al., the root causes of the ambiguity of the
results are problems with experimental control and experimental replication of treatments in the
same experiment. In what follows, I discuss both problems and then construct a response to
them. The crux of my response is that Wade and Goodnight’s calibration of a specific feature of
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 There are two ways to take Coyne et al.’s (1997) critique of Wade and Goodnight (1991). The first way is this:
Coyne et al. claim that Wade and Goodnight’s experiment does not demonstrate that Wright’s SBT produces a faster
response to selection than Fisher’s LPST. Taking Coyne et al.’s critique this way makes it a straw man, since
nowhere do Wade and Goodnight claim that their 1991 results show that Wright’s SBT produces a faster response to
selection than Fisher’s LPST. The second, and more charitable way to take Coyne et al.’s critique, in fact the way I
take the critique in my discussion, is that Coyne et al. claim that Wade and Goodnight’s experiment does not show
that Wright’s SBT and not Fisher’s LPST accounts for the reported response to selection.
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laboratory populations of Tribolium castaneum  to a variety of natural populations shows that
their results are not ambiguous as Coyne et al. (1997) charge.
Coyne et al.’s first complaint, the complaint regarding experimental controls, goes as
follows. Wade and Goodnight’s results (in Figure 3) are claimed to support Wright’s SBT and
specifically that the interaction between epistasis (non-additive genetic effects on fitness),
population structure, and interdemic selection account for the response to selection reported.
However, according to Coyne et al., without a mass selection control group to compare to the
shifting balance experimental group, Wade and Goodnight’s experiment does not impeach the
alternative that mass selection on additive genetic effects accounts for the experimental data.
On Coyne et al.’s view, interdemic selection can occur on any mode of gene action,
including the simple case of selection for an additive trait governed by a single locus. Wade and
Goodnight’s imposition of selection by differential dispersion is based on an experimental design
that assumes that demes contribute to the next generation in proportion to the deme’s mean
phenotypic value. This method is based on the quantitative genetics concept of family-selection,
or the view that only the family-groups (demes) with the highest mean fitness can contribute to
the next generation (Falconer 1989). Coyne et al. (1997, p. 663) claim that the family-selection
design allows that selection can modify almost any trait (of the beetle or any other organism),
including traits that are commonly understood as modified by mass selection (like bristle number
in Drosophila).
In order for Wade and Goodnight to show that the SBT unambiguously accounts for their
data, they must, say Coyne et al., compare an experimental shifting balance treatment against a
mass selection control treatment. The direct comparison would provide Wade and Goodnight
with a way to distinguish between traits affected by interdemic selection and traits affected by
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mass selection. But Wade and Goodnight do no such thing –the control arrays are unselected (see
above, especially Figure 1). According to Coyne et al., because Wade and Goodnight do not
control for mass selection, there is no justifiable way for them to make the claim that they have
provided empirical support for Wright’s SBT. Only a precise comparison between interdemic
selection on the shifting balance process and mass selection will resolve the problem.
Coyne et al.’s second objection to Wade and Goodnight’s experimental study of the SBT
concerns the ambiguity of experimental results due to lack of replication of the experimental
treatments (E1-E3). Wright (1931, 1932) claims that non-additive genetic effects on fitness are
foundational to understanding the evolutionary process. Indeed, as we saw at the beginning of
section (3) above, Wright includes such effects as core elements of evolution in his SBT. Wade
and Goodnight (1991) claim to have supported Wright’s inclusion via the results of their shifting
balance process laboratory experiment represented in Figure 3. Recall that Wade and Goodnight
claimed that because the slopes of the lines in the E1-E3 treatments were heterogeneous that
non-additive effects on fitness were present (see especially E2, selection every other generation).
The conclusion is that the heterogeneity of the slopes shows that non-additive genetic effects are
involved in the observed response to selection. Coyne et al. (1997, p. 663) object that because
Wade and Goodnight only used one experimental line for each of the three experimental
treatments they have not appropriately removed doubt that their data is not affected by artifacts
of the experimental design.
According to Coyne et al., the results in the E2 experimental line could be due to, e.g.,
some sort of sampling artifact in that line. Had Wade and Goodnight replicated all three lines,
there may be reason to claim that the results of the E2 treatments could be used to support a
claim that non-additive genetic effects on fitness were an evolutionary factor. However, Coyne et
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al. doubt even that proposition: “Even if their [Wade and Goodnight’s 1991] experimental results
were seen in multiple lines, however, it would not prove the existence of epistasis: It is also the
case that in models of group selection acting on a single locus, the largest response can occur
with intermittent selection” (Coyne et al. 1997, p. 663; see the supporting study by Wilson and
Colwell 1981). Coyne et al. conclude that Wade and Goodnight’s experimental results are
ambiguous: The results do not impeach the alternative mass selection hypothesis.
Coyne et al.’s charge of ambiguity of Wade and Goodnight’s experimental results is
weak. Indeed, both arguments that Coyne et al. mount, the first regarding lack of a specific type
of experimental control and the second regarding lack of experimental replication, can be shown
to be dubious with a single line of reasoning: Coyne et al. focus on two methods for justifying
observational and experimental claims, viz., control and replication of treatments in the same
experiment. However, Wade and Goodnight’s experimental design does not depend on the
experimental methods that Coyne et al. cite and in the way that Coyne et al. argue. Indeed,
specific to Coyne et al.’s two complaints, Wade and Goodnight’s experimental design depends
upon the following key method, viz., calibration of features of the laboratory model to data from
a variety of natural populations in the justification of their experimental claim. Because Coyne et
al. fail to consider adequately Wade and Goodnight’s experimental design, their critique is weak.
Consider, first, Coyne et al.’s charge that there is a problem with Wade and Goodnight’s
experimental controls. Here, Coyne et al. focus on the lack of a mass selection control group in
Wade and Goodnight’s E1-E3 treatments. Indeed, Wade and Goodnight use, as a control, a set of
unselected treatments as a way to demonstrate a response to interdemic selection. However, as a
further and alternative way of justifying their claim that Wright’s third phase is operating, Wade
and Goodnight do the following. They argue that a feature of their laboratory apparatus,
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specifically FST measures of population structure, is calibrated to a variety of plant and animal
systems in nature (viz., the above cited reviews by Loveless and Hamrick 1984 and Wright
1978). Recall that for the shifting balance process to work, the right kind of population structure
is key. Moreover, the precise population structure reported by Wade and Goodnight is indicative
of non-additive genetic variance (Wade 1991, 1992, Wade and Goodnight 1998, Wright 1978).
For these two reasons, it is crucial for Wade and Goodnight to emphasize the calibration of their
FST measures.
In broad strokes, Wade and Goodnight use the calibration strategy to ground their claim
that there is a non-additive basis to their response to interdemic selection and impeach the
alternative hypothesis that the genetic basis of the response is additive. More specifically, Wade
and Goodnight use the calibration strategy to bolster their claim that there is a non-additive
genetic basis to their reported response to interdemic selection in two ways. The first way
corresponds to Franklin’s (1986, 1990) and Rudge’s (1996, 1998) analysis of calibration
discussed in section (2) above. That is, Wade and Goodnight tune FST measures of their
laboratory population to natural populations to demonstrate that their apparatus is working
properly, thereby warranting their experimental results. The second way that Wade and
Goodnight use the calibration strategy is to warrant their broader claim that their experimental
results provide reason to think that Wright’s shifting balance process is likely to occur in nature.
Analysis of how the latter use of calibration works, a central aim of this paper, is spelled out in
some detail in section (5) below.
Coyne et al. miss Wade and Goodnight’s use of calibration as a strategy for
disambiguating between allowable interpretations of their experimental results. Yet, the two
ways in which Wade and Goodnight use the calibration strategy plausibly trump Coyne et al.’s
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demand for a mass selection control group. After all, via calibration Wade and Goodnight
provide independent reasons for thinking that the apparatus is working properly and, as we will
see below, they extrapolate their claims about the laboratory model to natural systems.
A general  response more illustrative of my line of reasoning against Coyne et al. can be
made to their second charge, regarding the lack of replication of experimental lines. The idea is
that Coyne et al. are myopically focusing on a specific experimental methodology when what
they must do, if they are to accurately depict Wade and Goodnight’s experimental design, is
criticize the host of experimental methods that Wade and Goodnight in fact use. Differently put,
there is a set of experimental methods, in particular calibration, that Wade and Goodnight use as
a package to justify their claim (and Wright’s) that the shifting balance process is operating.
Arguably, the package of methods that Wade and Goodnight use trumps the singular methods on
which Coyne et al. focus. Anyway, Coyne et al. do not even consider this point because they do
not scrutinize the actual experimental methods that Wade and Goodnight use. It is on these
grounds that Coyne et al.’s criticism is weak (if not also unfair).
In the above defense of Wade and Goodnight (1991), I drive a wedge between alternative
methods for justifying claims based on experimental results. Coyne et al. complain that Wade
and Goodnight fail to exercise proper experimental controls and to replicate their experimental
lines. My view is that the calibration strategy is a key part of a package of strategies employed
by Wade and Goodnight and that it trumps Coyne et al.’s critique. In the next section of the
paper, I show how the calibration strategy provides the justification it does for Wade and
Goodnight’s claim that their laboratory experimental results show that Wright’s shifting balance
process is likely to occur in nature. Further, I show how the strategy might fit into an
epistemology of experiment reflective of the case study discussed.
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5. Calibration as an Experimental Strategy
As we have seen, Franklin and Rudge have discussed calibration as an experimental strategy for
warranting claims that an experimental apparatus is working properly, which thereby warrants
the results produced by using that apparatus. As I view the strategy, calibration of laboratory
models further warrants hypotheses that artificial selection experiments done in the laboratory
correspond to the way selection works in natural populations. So, calibration is not merely a
strategy for justifying results in the way Franklin and Rudge argue, it is further a strategy that is
used to justify results from laboratory experiments by demonstrating that those results can be
extrapolated to natural populations.
But how does calibration do what I claim it does? I argue for the following related
claims: (a) Calibration of laboratory models increases the justificatory strength of empirical
claims based on laboratory experiments; (b) Calibration accomplishes (a) via its connection with
specific elements of Lloyd’s (1987, 1988) confirmation view. Indeed, making these two points
clear articulates the conceptual foundations of the crux of my defense of Wade and Goodnight
against Coyne et al.’s critique in section (4) above.
Consider claim (a). A claim of Diamond’s (1986) that is of special interest here is that he
views the evidence gathered from different sorts of experimental procedures, as he calls them
(Diamond 1986, p. 3), as weighed differently in evaluation contexts. Diamond distinguishes
between three different kinds of experiments, viz., laboratory experiments, field experiments,
and natural experiments. According to Diamond, the evidence gathered from natural experiments
is the strongest, and so on down the line to laboratory experiments, which provide the weakest
evidence, all else equal.
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Diamond claims that laboratory (and field) experiments have an air of artificiality about
them that can weaken their justificatory role relative to the “reality” of natural experiments
(Diamond 1986, p. 5). The artificiality of laboratory and field experiments consists in,
importantly, experimenter intervention in the experimental system. Wade and Goodnight’s
imposition of phase III of Wright’s SBT is an artificial perturbation in their Tribolium
population. Indeed, such intervention is intentional artificial selection on populations to observe
its downstream effects on genetic variation. On Diamond’s view, the observation of the same
perturbation occurring naturally, i.e., without experimenter interference, would be less artificial,
or more realistic (in the sense that phase III would occur naturally). As such, the evidence of a
natural perturbation would be stronger than evidence from an intentional one, all else equal
(Diamond 1986, pp. 5, 9, 13, 19). To be sure, intervention is not the only sort of artificiality in
evolutionary biology experiments: Use of, e.g., laboratory populations in highly controlled
environments is a further instance. (So, evidence from a laboratory experiment might, e.g., be
weaker than evidence from a field experiment given that the field experiment might involve the
use of natural populations, but also intervention.)
It is possible to see how the relative strength of evidence given its experimental source
(i.e., from the laboratory or the field) arises in the case of Wade and Goodnight’s experiment. In
Wade and Goodnight’s study concern is expressed regarding whether phase III selection is an
important evolutionary process in nature (Wade and Goodnight 1991, p. 1018). Wade and
Goodnight assume that the laboratory imposition of phase III on the flour beetle population is not
enough to establish such a conclusion. Indeed, other ways of providing justification of that claim
are required in addition to the intervention. Wade and Goodnight used, as we saw, calibration of
population structure of their laboratory population of beetles to a variety of natural populations.
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The idea is to increase the strength of the claim that phase III selection is important in nature as
opposed to (merely) achievable in the laboratory by showing that the populations are comparably
structured to those in nature. The strength of the empirical claim is increased by increasing what
Diamond calls the reality of the laboratory experiment. That is, by tempering the air of
artificiality of the laboratory intervention using the calibration strategy, Wade and Goodnight
increase the degree of reality Diamond requires for experimental results to gain strength. I
consider this idea a bit more fully below.
Given the above, Diamond’s claim about the greatest weakness of laboratory experiments
is weakened given the calibration strategy. That is, what calibration does is provide a practical
articulation of what Griesemer and Wade (1988, p. 77) claim is the character of the inference
from causes observed in the laboratory to causes in nature. Their idea is that the scientist finds
matches between the causes in the laboratory and causes in nature. My view is that calibration of
laboratory populations to natural populations is a key experimental strategy for demonstrating
those matches. According to Griesemer and Wade (1988), analogical reasoning drives the
matching between laboratory model and natural system. I have no dispute with Griesemer and
Wade about the analogical character of the matching inference. My aim has been to specify the
practical strategy used for making that inference and how to view that strategy as warranting the
claim being made. The ensuing discussion of claim (b) above, that calibration increases the
justificatory strength of empirical claims based on laboratory experiments via its connection with
specific elements of Lloyd’s (1987, 1988) confirmation view, fleshes out my claim about
warrant.
Lloyd (1987, 1988) has argued that confirmation of evolutionary and ecological models
can be practically specified by the following three strategies, viz., (1) fit between theoretical
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model and data; (2) independent support for aspects of a particular theoretical model; and (3)
variety of evidence (which includes varieties of instances of fit and independent support).7
Following Lloyd (1988, pp. 146-52), briefly, fit between model and data is the determination of a
matching between the predictions of a theoretical model and experimental results. Demonstrating
fit relies on straightforward statistical curve fitting techniques. Independent support for aspects
of a particular model concerns independently garnered empirical evidence for specific
assumptions built into a particular theoretical model. Variety of evidence amplifies the two
strategies above and comes in three forms, viz., variety of instances of fit, variety of independent
support for aspects of a model, and variety of types of support.
Lloyd sees herself as describing at least part of the set of techniques evolutionary
biologists use to relate theoretical models to natural systems. More specifically, she sees her
three confirmation strategies as concretely articulating techniques that are part and parcel of an
experimental model (following Suppes 1962). In the context of my discussion of calibration, the
laboratory model (defined in section 2 above) corresponds to a specific instantiation (in the
laboratory) of Lloyd’s conception of an experimental model. And I see my discussion as
specifying even more concretely Lloyd’s confirmation account as an articulation of an
experimental model. That is, I see calibration as a specifically experimental strategy that is used
to spell out how to understand the relative strength of the claims that there is fit between model
and data, independent support for aspects of a model, and variety of evidence.
Variety of evidence is at the core of Lloyd’s confirmation account. Variety of evidence as
a strategy itself is at bottom iterations and/or combinations of the strategies of fit between
theoretical model and data and independent support for aspects of a theoretical model. Lloyd’s
                                                      
7
 Lloyd discusses these strategies as criteria. But I see no cost to substituting my “strategy” for her “criterion,” as I
do not think there is any specific weight placed on her use of “criterion.”
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intuition behind variety of evidence is that numerous demonstrations of, e.g., fit, or, e.g.,
independent support, can increase the strength of the hypothesis that a theoretical model
corresponds to the natural system modeled. That is, 10 instances of fit over data for populations
of size 1000 places a relevant hypothesis in a different confirmation situation than 10 instances
of fit over data for populations ranging in size between 1 and 1,000,000 (Lloyd 1988, p. 148). A
similar claim can be made for independent support. The more times, the more different ways,
and the more assumptions are tested independently, the greater the empirical support for an
hypothesis made about a model that is based on the assumption. Variety of types of support is
just a mixture of variety of instances of fit and variety of independent support. So, an hypothesis
made about a theoretical model that has a variety of instances of fit along with a variety of
instances of independent support for its assumptions is in a different situation regarding its
confirmation than a theory with only one instance of fit.
Here is how I see the explicit connection between the strategy of evaluating variety of
evidence and calibration in grounding the strength of Wade and Goodnight’s claim. Wade and
Goodnight’s laboratory model included, as a part of its apparatus, laboratory populations of
Tribolium. Their aim was to use those populations to determine whether Wright’s phase III and,
more generally, Wright’s SBT, could be considered to describe an important evolutionary
process. As I discussed in sections (3) and (4) above, the main way Wade and Goodnight argued
that Wright’s SBT is important in evolution is by calibrating the population structure of the flour
beetle population to the same aspect of other natural populations (of plants and animals,
reviewed by Loveless and Hamrick 1984, Wright 1978). As we saw, the FST measure indicating
population structure was chosen for calibration because such population structure is crucial to the
operation of Wright’s shifting balance process. Moreover, such population structure is indicative
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of non-additive genetic variance, a foundational assumption of Wright’s SBT. Wade and
Goodnight’s view is, it seems to me, as follows: If such a match between an aspect of the
laboratory population and populations in nature exists, and that factor is central to bringing about
evolutionary change on Wright’s SBT, then the shifting balance process can be (according to
Wade and Goodnight) considered as likely to describe an important evolutionary process. The
calibration of the laboratory population, a part of the apparatus (which also included, vials, flour,
incubators, microscopes, etc.), played a crucial role in Wade and Goodnight’s evaluation of their
results.
Wade and Goodnight did not merely calibrate their flour beetle population to, e.g.,
another laboratory or natural population of flour beetles. Rather, they calibrated their data to
several, various natural populations for which the relevant population structure data had been
previously collected (Loveless and Hamrick 1984, Wright 1978). So, in order to strengthen their
empirical claim that Wright’s SBT is important in evolution, Wade and Goodnight provided a
variety of evidence, specifically, a variety of independent support of aspects of a theoretical
model by calibrating their laboratory model to natural populations. Differently put, a key
assumption built into Wright’s SBT is that populations are structured in specific ways. This
assumption provides for specific conditions for the shifting balance process to be realized,
specifically the interaction between epistasis, migration, and interdemic selection. Relevant to
Wade and Goodnight’s experimental study, FST values should be in the range 0.03-0.05 to satisfy
the assumption. By calibrating their laboratory model to natural populations, Wade and
Goodnight provide independent support for an aspect of Wright’s SBT (which is a family of
theoretical models). As we saw, FST values for Wade and Goodnight’s laboratory population fit
FST values in the 0.03-0.05 range across a variety of populations found in nature, viz., 13
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different species of plant reviewed by Loveless and Hamrick (1984) and numerous species of
plant and animal reviewed by Wright (1978). Further, by providing numerous and varied
instances of independent support for this key assumption of Wright’s SBT, Wade and Goodnight
increase the confirmatory standing of their hypothesis via a variety of evidence.
The use of calibration by Wade and Goodnight fits the core of Lloyd’s confirmation
account nicely. One way to increase the confirmatory standing of an hypothesis is to provide
independent support for aspects of a theoretical model in a variety of ways. Wade and Goodnight
increased the confirmatory standing of Wright’s SBT by providing, via the calibration of their
laboratory model, a variety of evidence in the form of a variety of independent support of aspects
of the SBT.
What I have argued so far is that the key epistemological strategy for understanding the
justification of Wade and Goodnight’s claim that Wright’s SBT is an important evolutionary
process in nature is driven by the calibration of the apparatus, i.e., the flour beetle population, of
their laboratory model to populations in nature. This calibration strategy allows Wade and
Goodnight to claim that the shifting balance process imposed in the laboratory corresponds to
instances of evolution in nature. Further, the way in which the calibration strategy was used, i.e.,
by marshalling a variety of independent support for aspects of the SBT, increases the strength of
their claim.
I have said that calibration as an experimental strategy specifies Lloyd’s (1987, 1988)
confirmation account. Lloyd takes her account to be a practical specification of the evaluation of
experimental models. I take myself to have extended that specification by articulating a concrete
experimental strategy that is used to generate the very types of justifications that Lloyd (rightly)
demands. My working hypothesis is that such could be done for a number of experimental
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strategies, such as those delineated by Franklin (1986, 1990, 2002) and Rudge (1996, 1998).
However, doing so here is beyond the scope of the essay, because another key aim has been to
defend Wade and Goodnight (1991) from charges leveled at them by Coyne, Barton, and Turelli
(1997).
At any rate, Franklin and Rudge have articulated calibration, among other strategies, in
their own epistemological frameworks. As we saw, Franklin (1986, 1990) and one version of
Rudge (1998) used the Bayesian epistemology to run their epistemology of experiment. Rudge
(2001) later argued that Mayo’s (1996) error statistical approach better depicts his case, i.e.,
industrial melanism in the peppered moth. I present calibration as part of, and connected to, a
further set of theory evaluation strategies (following Darden 1991 on the concept of a strategy).
Nevertheless, a Bayesian or error statistical gloss on the strategies presented here could, at least
to some extent, be used to more formally “epistemologize” them.
6. Conclusion
I have argued that Wade and Goodnight (1991) used calibration as an experimental strategy for
warranting their claim that Wright’s SBT is an important evolutionary process. Moreover, I have
shown how their use of calibration defends them from Coyne et al.’s (1997) objection that the
results are ambiguous. Ultimately, my view is that calibration of laboratory models is a key
experimental strategy for warranting claims made via laboratory experiments in population
genetics. Calibration allows an experimenter in population genetics to warrant claims about the
correspondence between laboratory systems and natural systems.
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